The Killing Fields of Australian Care Homes

After two centuries, the apple has not fallen far from the tree.

Two centuries since the first English outpost was established in Australia, it seems the colonials haven’t changed much.

Much like the English, the Australians have a huge amount of public health data but don’t really know what to do with it. As a result, they’ve ended up killing their care home residents just like the English did.

Instead of analysing the data and looking for insights that could steer public health policy in the direction of, er, health of the public, all they present is bulletin after bulletin extolling their jab successes:

So, what does the coercion of the entire care home workforce into getting jabbed succeed in doing? Did it protect the residents?

Did the residents protect themselves with their near perfect record of double jabs? What could explain the dramatic disinterest in the fourth?

Unfortunately, the data controllers don’t present the data in any useful format and the PDFs they publish vary from week to week in terms of how the data is presented and consistency so piecing it together to perform any kind of forensic analysis has been a very tedious and painstaking task.

Hopefully, the insights will be worth it.

My first observation is an obvious one. After the initial COVID outbreaks in (Australian) winter 2020, COVID goes away in Australia. There is virtually not a single case in any care home for well over six months between the following spring and autumn.

Figure 1

Figure 1 shows COVID cases for care home staff and residents from Sep 2020 to Dec 2021. The data was not published prior to the start date but suffice to say that there was even less COVID in the prior period if it is consistent with case data at the national, community level

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So then, what do we have? Apart from no COVID at all between Oct 2020 and June 2021, we can also observe that, when there is COVID, the number of staff and resident cases appear to track each other very closely in terms of timing (which is not at all surprising) but also relative magnitude.

However, at the end of Aug 2021, that relationship breaks down and residents are infected substantially more than staff.

Of course, public health isn’t even seeing this so there’s nothing for them to investigate. And even if they did, they would most certainly ignore the elephant in the room.

Nevertheless, given that the most prudent thing to do is to investigate the single biggest change in the situation, i.e. the injecting of virtually every single care home resident and staff at the time of this data anomaly - duty bound if you’re agency responsible for introducing the intervention - that’s what I did:

Figure 2

And what do we find? We find that the jab campaign started for the staff about two months before the (Australian) winter and the campaign for the residents at the start of the season, around mid-June (Figure 2).

Yes, there are respiratory disease outbreaks in winter. No great insight there. And yes, they “vaccinate” at the start of the campaign. So far, so coincidental.

Nevertheless, the break out of resident cases over staff cases is about 9 to 10 weeks after the jab campaign, a period where the literature is now quite abundant with information about potential antibody disease enhancement as the “protection” wanes.

Second coincidence.

We should also take note at this point that by Oct 2020, COVID had completely gone. No “vaccines”. Seasonal.

And yet, in Oct 2021, by which time we have near 100% jabbed staff and residents, COVID is still rising sharply into its peak, and by the start of the summer (when seasonal respiratory pathogens usually go into estivation), case levels are still as high as they were at the peak of the winter before vaccines came along. Go figure!

Alas, that’s actually nowhere near the worst of it.

As summer progresses, instead of COVID eventually going away, it doesn’t just linger, but it explodes.

Figure 3

In case, you think your eyes deceive you or I’m exaggerating when I say explode, take a look at the scale in Figure 3! It’s gone from 180 to 8,000!!

What on earth could be responsible for such an explosion in cases? Wasn’t the vaccine supposed to create a “dead end” for this virus?

And once again, from autumn 2022, we witness that dramatic dislocation again, whereby residents are infected at twice the rate of the staff.

I think, perhaps, we should take another look at our elephant?

Figure 4

Sure enough, the explosion of COVID cases in summer 2021 coincides exactly with the fist booster campaign.

We’ve already established that COVID is seasonal. It totally respected seasonality before the vaccination campaign.

Not a coincidence.

And about the relative increase of resident cases over staff? Having completely missed (rather, ignored) the signal in the first round of jabbing, those dunces in public health promote yet another booster in mid-April 2022.

Although it’s not totally conclusive, my forensic data analysis reveals that virtually none of those boosters was administered to the staff, just the residents.

So, doesn’t look like the vaccine is providing protection from disease either, on top of no protection from infection and transmission.

Oh well, at least no-one died, right?

Right??

Figure 5

Oh.

Doesn’t protect against death either then?

In fact, enhances it. That’ll be the vaccine-associated enhanced disease for you.

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